Abstract. In the usual framework of continuum games, we substantially generalize Cournot-Nash existence results (Balder [3, 4, 7]) to games with possibly non-ordered preferences, providing a continuum analogue of the seminal existence results by and Shafer-Sonnenschein [24] .
Introduction
In recent years attempts were made to extend the seminal equilibrium existence results of Gale-Mas-Colell [12] and Shafer-Sonnenschein [24] , formulated for abstract games and economies with a finite set of players, to the framework of continuum economies and games with a measure space of agents. It is proved in Balder [5] that the usual conditions used in the literature for these attempts force the preferred to multifunction to be emptyvalued almost everywhere on the nonatomic part of the measure space, rendering several published extensions pointless. Yet, at the same time, existence results are well-known to hold in continuum games, but only by means of proofs that thoroughly exploit the payoff function structure and its standard-type conditions.
We assert that the modeling of non-ordered preferences provided in Balder [5] , BalderYannelis [8] , 13] , Khan-Vohra [15] , Kim-Prikry-Yannelis [16] , Noguchi [19, 20] and Yannelis [25, 26] is not relevant to continuum games with externalities. We propose a new modeling of preferences (see Remark 2.1) that encompasses both the modeling of ordered preferences with externalities of Balder [4, 7] and the modeling of non-ordered preferences but without externalities of Schmeidler [22] , Cornet-TopuzuYildiz [10] and Martins-da-Rocha [17, 18] . Moreover our modeling of non-ordered preferences does not suffer from the serious inconsistency pointed out in Balder [5] .
The main result of the paper is the existence of pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium for continuum games with possibly non-ordered preferences. In the framework of ordered preferences (i.e. each agent has a utility/payoff function), the existence of pure CournotNash equilibrium is proved in Balder [4, 7] as a corollary of an existence result of mixed Cournot-Nash equilibrium by means of Young measure theory. We propose in this paper two independent proofs for our existence result. First (see Section 4.1) we prove that the existence result for games with non-ordered preferences is a simple corollary of the well-known existence result for games with ordered preferences. From a game with nonordered preferences, we define an auxiliary game with payoff functions such that the set of optimal actions for both games coincide. It is then sufficient to apply the existence results in Balder [4, 7] . We also provide (see Section 4.2) a second and independent proof only by means of pure action profiles. This proof involves the feeble topology introduced by Balder [4] .
The paper is organized as follows. The model and the main existence result (Theorem 2.1) are presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide assumptions on the primitives of the game in order to apply Theorem 2.1. The last section is devoted to the two independent proofs of the main result. For precise definitions of the different continuity concepts for multifunctions used in the paper, we refer to Appendix A.
The model and the main result
Let (T, T , µ) be an abstract finite measure space. The set T is the set of players, which may be a finite set or a continuum such as the unit interval or a mixture of both. For technical reasons we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1. The measure space (T, T , µ) is complete and separable.
Let S be Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space that is a Suslin space, i.e. S is the continuous image of a Polish space. The space S is the action space. Examples of such spaces include separable Banach spaces, equipped with their norm or weak topology, duals of separable Banach spaces, equipped with their weak star topology, separable Fréchet spaces, such as C(R), equipped with the compact-open topology, or the space of all bounded, signed measures on a completely regular Suslin space. We denote by S * the topological dual of S. For each t in T , let S t ⊂ S denote the action set of player t. We denote by Σ the multifunction from T into S defined by Σ(t) := S t .
We let T in T be some fixed measurable subset of players that contains the purely atomic part of (T, T , µ). The set T is the set of players that will satisfy additional convexity assumptions. We let T denote the set T \ T and we let T (resp. T ) be the trace σ-algebra of T on T (resp. T ). We suppose that the following holds. Assumption 2.2. For every t ∈ T , the set S t is non-empty and compact, and the graph
of the multifunction Σ belongs to T ⊗ B(S). Moreover, for every t ∈ T , the set S t is convex.
We let D be the trace σ-algebra of T ⊗ B(S) on D. An action profile is a function f : T → S that is measurable with respect to T and B(S) or, equivalently that is scalarly measurable, i.e. for all s * ∈ S * , the scalar functions t → f (t), s * is T -measurable. Let S denote the set of all action profiles. An action profile f is feasible if f (t) belongs to S t for a.e. t ∈ T . The set of all feasible action profiles is denoted by S Σ . Also, let S Σ be the set of all restrictions to T of functions in S Σ ; it is only this set that needs to be topologized. We endow S Σ with the feeble topology introduced by Balder (see [4, 7] ). The feeble topology on S Σ is defined as the coarsest topology for which all functionals
are continuous. Here G LC,Σ is the collection of all T ⊗ B(S)-measurable functions g : T × S → R for which g(t, .) is linear and continuous on S (i.e. belongs to S * ) for every t ∈ T and for which there is an integrable function φ g in L 1 R (T , T , µ) with sup s∈St |g(t, s)| φ g (t) for all t ∈ T . The feeble topology can simultaneously subsume the two customary topologies that have been used in the literature on games with a measure space of players (we refer to Balder [4, 7] to precisions and examples). Following Balder [7, Remark 4.3.1] the space S Σ is compact, the feeble topology on S Σ is semimetrizable and if a sequence (f n ) converges feebly to f in S Σ , then
Let us now define as the externality of each player t ∈ T the mapping d :
Here f | T ∈ S Σ stands for the restriction to T of f ∈ S Σ . Also, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, g i : D ∩ ( T × S) → R is a given function that satisfies the following condition. Assumption 2.3. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, g i belongs to G C,Σ .
Here G C,Σ is the collection of all T ⊗B(S)-measurable functions g : T ×S → R for which g(t, .) is continuous on S for every t ∈ T and for which there is an integrable function φ g in L 1 R ( T , T , µ) with sup s∈St |g(t, s)| φ g (t) for all t ∈ T . The externality d(f ) depends on the action f (t) of each player t in T and depends only on the aggregated(f ) over all T .
Each player t ∈ T must choose her actions in accordance with the other players as follows: given the action profile f ∈ S Σ , player t's socially feasible actions constitute a given subset A t (d(f )) ⊂ S t . Until now our model follows almost verbatim the model presented in Balder [4, 7] . Further, we consider a more general framework to model the preference of each player. Every player t ∈ T has a preferred to multifunction
Given the action profilef ∈ S Σ , the externality vector y ∈ R m and an action s ∈ S t , the set P t (s,f , y) represents the set of actions s ∈ S t that agent t strictly prefers to action s.
Example 2.1. In Balder [4, 7] , each agent t is endowed with a payoff function U t :
In that case, P t is defined by
Remark 2.1. Observe that given an agent t ∈ T , the preferred to multifunction P t is defined on S t ×S Σ ×R m . In the literature (see [19, 20] and Yannelis [25, 26] ), the preferred to multifunction is defined only on S Σ × R m . Moreover it is claimed in Balder [6] that for a game with payoff functions U t :
, the canonical preferred to multifunction for an agent t ∈ T is defined by
We claim that this modeling of preferences is not relevant. First because it is proved in Balder [6] that the usual conditions used in the literature for this model force the preferred to multifunctions to be empty valued almost everywhere in the nonatomic part of the measure space of agents. Second because this model does not encompass the literature dealing with games or abstract economies with a measure space of agents but without externalities: in Schmeidler [22] , Cornet-Topuzu-Yildiz [10] and Martins-da-Rocha [17, 18] the preferred to multifunction P t is defined on S t , hence a natural modeling of preferences to deal with externalities is to consider a preferred to multifunction P t defined on S t ×S Σ ×R m . We refer to Balder [7, Section 2.4] for a discussion about the consistency question regarding to our modeling of preferences.
Definition 2.1. For each t ∈ T ,f ∈ S Σ and y ∈ R m , we denote by M t (f , y) the set of optimal actions in the socially feasible set A t (f , y), i.e.
Example 2.2. If agent t is endowed with a payoff function U t :
We present hereafter the list of assumptions the optimal actions multifunction will be required to satisfy.
Assumption 2.4 (convexity).
For each player t ∈ T , the multifunction M t has convex values, i.e. for each (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m , the set M t (f , y) is convex. Assumption 2.5 (continuity). For each player t ∈ T , the multifunction (f , y) → M t (f , y) is upper-semicontinuous with non-empty values. Assumption 2.6 (measurability). For every (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m , the multifunction t → M t (f , y) has a measurable graph.
Remark 2.2. Assumption 2.4 is satisfied if for every player t ∈ T , for every (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m the set A t (f , y) and for every action s ∈ S t , the set {s ∈ S t : s ∈ P t (s ,f , y)} are convex. In particular, if the preferred to multifunction is defined by a payoff function
We provide in Section 3 conditions on the primitives A and P of a game such that Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6 are satisfied.
Theorem 2.1. Under Assumptions 2.1 to 2.6, the game Γ := (T, Σ, A, P ) has a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium, that is, there exists an action profile f * ∈ S Σ such that for almost every player t ∈ T ,
Remark 2.3. We propose in Section 4 two approaches to prove Theorem 2.1. In Section 4.1, we consider a game Γ satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.6. We define an auxiliary game Γ with payoff functions such that optimal action profiles for Γ and optimal action profiles for Γ coincide. We check that the auxiliary game Γ satisfies the set of assumptions needed to apply Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7] . We then get the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for Γ which is also a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the initial game Γ. Following this approach, our existence for non-ordered preferences appears to be a corollary of the existence results for ordered preferences in Balder [4, 7] .
In Section 4.1 we propose a proof purely by means of the feeble topology which is an independent proof of Theorem 2.2.1 in Balder [7] . It was already announced in Balder [4, Section 5] and Balder [7, Remark 4.3.1] that such a proof was possible for ordered preferences. However the proof we propose deals not only with ordered preferences but also with non-ordered preferences. 
Assumptions on primitives
Let Γ = (T, Σ, A, P ) be a game. We provide in this section conditions on the primitives A and P of the game such that Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6 are satisfied. We first consider a list of assumptions on the multifunction A of socially feasible actions.
We consider now a list of assumptions on the preferred to multifunction P .
(i) for every s ∈ S t , s ∈ P t (s,f , y) and one of the two following conditions is satisfied:
a. the multifunction s → P t (s,f , y) is transitive
(iv) the graph of the multifunction (t, s) → P t (s,f , y) belongs to T ⊗ B(S) ⊗ B(S). function A t is lower-semicontinuous; (iii.3) the multifunction P t is lower-semicontinuous and A t (f , y) = S t .
Corollary 3.1. Let Γ = (T, Σ, A, P ) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4, 3.1 and 3.2. Then the game Γ has a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We can check that under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 imply Assumptions 2.5 and 2.6. Indeed, Assumption 3.1(iii) and Assumption 3.2(iv) imply Assumption 2.6. Assumption 3.1(i) and Assumption 3.2(i-ii) imply that for each (f , y) the set M t (f , y) is non-empty. Assumption 3.1(ii) and Assumption 3.2(iii) imply that the multifunction M t is upper-semicontinuous.
We provide now a corollary of Corollary 3.1 for games with payoff functions. 1 The multifunction s → Pt(s,f , y) is transitive if for each (s, s , s ) in S Assumption 3.3. For each t ∈ T , agent t is endowed with a payoff function U t :
Corollary 3.2. Let Γ = (T, Σ, A, P ) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1-2.4, 3.1 and 3.3. Then the game Γ has a pure Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We can check that under Assumptions 2. 
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Let Γ := (T, Σ, A, P ) be a game satisfying Assumptions 2.1 to 2.4. Since S is Suslin there exists a metric d on S which is weaker than the original topology. Hence on compact subsets of S the original topology and the d-topology coincide. Observe that each Borel σ-algebra corresponding to the d-topology coincides with B(S), because S is Suslin (Corollary 2 of Theorem II.10 of Schwartz [23] ).
Indirect proof. For each player t ∈ T , consider the payoff function
We consider now the game Γ := (T, Σ, A , P ) which is truly noncooperative, i.e. for each (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m , A t (f , y) = S t . The preferred to multifunction is defined by the payoff function V , i.e. P t (s,f , y) := {s ∈ S t : V t (s ,f , y) > V t (s,f , y)}.
Claim 4.1. For every t ∈ T , the function V t is upper-semicontinuous.
Proof. Let t ∈ T and c ∈ R, we have to prove that
is closed. Let (s n ,f n , y n ) be a sequence in L which converges to (s,f , y) ∈ S t × S Σ × R m . For each n > 0, there existss n in M t (f n , y n ) such that d(s n ,s n ) c + 1/n. Since S t is compact, passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can suppose that (s n ) is convergent tõ s in S t . From Assumption 2.5,s belongs to M t (f , y), hence
Proof. Let (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m , we let F : T → 2 S be the multifunction defined by F (t) := M t (f , y). From Assumption 2.6 the multifunction F has a measurable graph. From Castaing-Valadier [9, Theorem III.22] (see also Sainte Beuve [21] ), there exists a sequence (σ n ) of measurable functions σ n : T → S such that (σ n (t)) is dense in F (t) for every t ∈ T . It follows that for each s ∈ S, d(s, F (t)) = inf{d(s, σ n (t)) : n ∈ N}.
Hence for each s ∈ S the function t → d(s, F (t)) is measurable, and for each t ∈ T , the function s → d(s, F (t)) is continuous. Applying Lemma III.14 in Castaing-Valadier [9] , we get that (t, s) → d(s, F (t)) is T ⊗ B(S)-measurable. Since F (t) is a subset of S t , it follows that (t, s) → d(s, F (t)) is D-measurable.
Claim 4.3. For every t ∈ T , for every (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m ,
Proof. Let t ∈ T and (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m . From Assumption 2.5, the set M t (f , y) is nonempty, hence there exists σ ∈ S t such that V t (σ,f , y) = 0. Now since V t (s,f , y) 0 for each s ∈ S t , we have that
From Assumption 2.5, M t (f , y) is closed, hence the claim follows.
We claim that the game Γ satisfies Assumptions 2.2.5 to 2.2.7 in Balder [7] . Indeed, the game Γ is truly noncooperative, in the sense that for each (f , y) ∈ S Σ × R m , for every t ∈ T , A t (f , y) = S t . Hence Assumption 2. [7] to get the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium f * for the game Γ . Obviously f * is also a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the game Γ.
4.2. Direct proof. For each (f , y) ∈ S Σ ×R m we let S M (f ,y) denote the set of all functions g ∈ S Σ such thatḡ(t) ∈ M t (f , y) for a.e. t ∈ T . Let Y be the subset of R m defined by
where S Σ is the set of all restrictions to T of functions in S Σ .
Claim 4.5. The set Y is compact convex and non-empty.
where S M (f ,y) is the set of all functionsĝ ∈ S Σ such thatĝ(t) ∈ M t (f , y) for a.e. t ∈ T . Hence there existsf * ∈ S M (f * ,y * ) such that y * =d(f * ). Let f * be the function defined by
The function f * belongs to S Σ and (f * , y * ) = d(f * ). Following (4.1), f * (t) ∈ M t (d(f * )) for a.e. t ∈ T , i.e. f * is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ. (iii) the set {(s, δ) ∈ S × ∆ :
Proof of: (iii1) implies (iii). For each (s, δ) ∈ S ×∆, P (s, δ) is open hence P (s, δ)∩A(δ) = ∅ if and only if P (s, δ) ∩ B(δ) = ∅. Let (s, δ) ∈ S × ∆ such that P (s, δ) ∩ B(δ) = ∅ and let σ ∈ S be such that σ ∈ P (s, δ) ∩ B(δ).
Since P has open lower-sections there exist open sets U and V in S and ∆ such that (s, δ) ∈ U × V and for each (s , δ ) ∈ U × V , P (s , δ ) σ.
Since B has open lower-sections there exists an open set W in ∆ such that δ ∈ W and for each δ ∈ W , B(δ ) σ. It then follows that (s, δ) ∈ U × (V ∩ W ) and for 
Proof of: (iii3) implies (iii). For each (s, δ) ∈ S × ∆, P (s, δ) ∩ A(δ) = ∅ if and only if P (s, δ) ∩ S = ∅. The set S is open, hence (iii) follows from the lower semi-continuity of the multifunction P .
Appendix B. Proof of Claim 4.4
We first prove that for each (f , y), the set S M (f ,y) is non-empty and convex. Fix (f , y), from Assumption 2.6 the multifunction t → M t (f , y) has a measurable graph. By applying the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of CastaingValadier [9] ) there exists a measurable selection of t → M t (f , y). This implies that the set S M (f ,y) is non-empty. The convexity follows from Assumption 2.4.
We now prove that the multifunction (f , y) → S M (f ,y) is upper-semicontinuous. For each (f , y), the set S M (f ,y) is a subset of the compact set S Σ . Hence to prove the uppersemicontinuity, we consider a sequence (f n , y n ,ḡ n ) in
We have to prove thatḡ belongs to S M (f ,y) . From (2.1)
From Assumption 2.5 the multifunction M t (., .) is upper-semicontinuous and then p∈N cl {f n (t) : n p} ⊂ M t (f , y) a.e. t ∈ T .
From Assumptions 2.4 and 2.5, the set M t (f , y) is closed convex, thus
Appendix C. Proof of Claim 4.5
We first prove that the set Y is non-empty and convex. From Assumption 2.2 the multifunction t → S t has a measurable graph. By applying the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing-Valadier [9] ) there exists a measurable selection of t → S t . This implies that the set S Σ is non-empty and thus Y is non-empty. The convexity follows from the Extended Lyapunov Theorem in Balder [2] .
We now prove that Y is a compact set. From Assumption 2.3, the set Y is bounded. Consider now a sequence (y n ) in Y converging to y ∈ R m . There exists a sequence (f n ) in S Σ such that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, y
For each n ∈ N, denote by ϕ n (t) the vector (g j (t,f n (t))) in R m . From the multivalued Fatou's Lemma by Artstein [1] , there exists an integrable mapping ϕ : T → R m such that y = b T ϕ(t)µ(dt) and ϕ(t) ∈ co p∈N cl {ϕ n (t) : n p} a.e. t ∈ T .
For each t ∈ T , the set S t is compact and the mapping g j (t, .) is continuous. It then follows that for almost every t ∈ T there exists s t ∈ S t such that ϕ j (t) = g j (t, s t ) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Let Σ ϕ : T → S be the multifunction defined by ∀t ∈ T , Σ ϕ (t) = {s ∈ Σ(t) : g j (t, s) = ϕ j (t) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}}.
The multifunction Σ ϕ has a measurable graph with non-empty values. By applying the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of CastaingValadier [9] ) there exists a measurable selectionf of Σ ϕ . In particular
g j (t,f (t))µ(dt) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, which yields that y ∈ Y .
Appendix D. Proof of Claim 4.6
We first prove that for each (f , y), the set Y(f , y) is non-empty and convex. Fix (f , y), from Assumption 2.6 the multifunction t → M t (f , y) has a measurable graph. By applying the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of CastaingValadier [9] ) there exists a measurable selection of t → M t (f , y). This implies that the set S M (f ,y) is non-empty. The convexity follows from the Extended Lyapunov Theorem in Balder [2] .
We now prove that the multifunction (f , y) → Y(f , y) is upper-semicontinuous. For each (f , y), the set Y(f , y) is a subset of the compact set Y . Hence to prove the uppersemicontinuity, we consider a sequence (f n , y n , z n ) in S Σ × R m × Y converging to (f , y, z) in S Σ × R m × Y such that ∀n ∈ N, z n ∈ Y(f n , y n ).
We have to prove that z belongs to Y(f , y). There exists a sequence (ĥ n ) in S M (fn,yn) such that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, z n j = b T g j (t,ĥ n (t))µ(dt).
For each n ∈ N, denote by ϕ n (t) the vector (g j (t,ĥ n (t))) in R m . From the multivalued Fatou's Lemma by Artstein [1] , there exists an integrable mapping ϕ : T → R m such that z = b T ϕ(t)µ(dt) and ϕ(t) ∈ co p∈N cl {ϕ n (t) : n p} a.e. t ∈ T .
For each t ∈ T , the multifunction M t (., .) is upper-semicontinuous and the mapping g j (t, .) is continuous. It then follows that for almost every t ∈ T there exists s t ∈ M t (f , y) such that ϕ j (t) = g j (t, s t ) for every j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Let Σ M : T → S be the multifunction defined by ∀t ∈ T , Σ M (t) = {s ∈ M t (f , y) : g j (t, s) = ϕ j (t) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}}.
From Assumption 2.6 the multifunction Σ M has a measurable graph with non-empty values. By applying the von Neumann-Aumann measurable selection theorem (Theorem III.22 of Castaing-Valadier [9] ) there exists a measurable selectionĥ of Σ M . In particular
h j (t,f (t))µ(dt) ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, which yields that z ∈ Y(f , y).
